The empirical nonequivalence between grants by a central government and increases in community income~the "flypaper effect"! has been considered anomalous. But the "anomaly" label is naïve: in a multiconsumer community, equivalence demands an unlikely match of tax rules and income-growth patterns.
Introduction
We learn in introductory economics that an in-kind subsidy to a consumer is theoretically equivalent to an increase in the consumer's income~as long as the constraint of consuming at least the amount of the in-kind subsidy does not bind!. Does the equivalence carry over to in-kind subsidies by a central government to a local one? More precisely, does an increase in the amount of local public goods financed by the federal government have the same effect on the total amount of the local public good eventually supplied as an increase in the income of the community? The empirical answer is a resounding "no": Hines and Thaler~1995, Table 1 ! report on 10 studies where an additional dollar of a federal grant earmarked for the consumption of the public good increases the supply of local public goods, on the average, by 63.7 cents, an amount substantially larger than the increase in the supply of local public goods caused by an additional dollar in the community's income.
The gap has been dubbed the "flypaper effect," and a sizable literature on that effect now exists. Much of it adopts the single-consumer theoretical model or simple extensions thereof. The empirically observed flypaper effect is then an anomaly~Hamilton 1983; Hines and Thaler 1995! or a "difficulty,"~Fisher 1982!, variously attributed to "fiscal illusion" Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld 1979; Dollery and Worthington 1999 !, the activity of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat~Oates 1979; Romer and Rosenthal 1980 !, imperfect information and uncertainty~Turnbull 1992 , 1998 !, or loss aversion and lack of fungibility~Hines and Thaler 1995!.
Here we argue that the "anomaly" label is naïve, because, as soon as the single-consumer assumption is abandoned, sensible models of collective decision making will generically predict the nonequivalence of in-kind subsidies and income increases for a community. Our arguments are based on the predictions of politico-economic models where two parties compete and where the amount of the in-kind subsidy and the community's wealth are independent, exogenous parameters. 1 The generic nonequivalence of in-kind subsidies and income increases already appears in unidimensional policy models where the median voter theorem applies: Section 2 below shows that equivalence then requires that the income formation pattern and the tax rules precisely match, an unrealistic feature because they are determined by independent processes. It follows that nonequivalence is generic, but, without further specification, this analysis cannot determine the sign, let alone the magnitude, of the flypaper effect.
Moreover, realistic tax policies are two-dimensional: existing effective taxes are realistically approximated by a tax function with a constant marginal tax rate and a decreasing average tax rate. We therefore proceed to apply a concept, recently proposed by one of us, of politicoeconomic equilibrium in the case where policy spaces are multidimensional. We offer a simulation of a model with a two-dimensional space of tax regimes where an additional thousand dollars of a federal grant earmarked for the consumption of the public good increases the supply of local public goods, on average, by precisely $635-virtually identical to the marginal propensity to consume out of public funds that Hines and Thaler~1995! report.
The Logic of Nonequivalence When Policies
Are Unidimensional
The present paper assumes two goods-one public and one private-and n citizen-consumers. The amount of the public good is denoted G, the amount of the private good consumed by i is denoted m i , and i 's utility function is written u i~G , m i !. The community can transform one unit of the private good into one unit of the public good. The federal government grant, earmarked for the provision of the public good, is denoted s.
Our main model~Section 3 below! postulates a two-dimensional policy space, but the generic nonequivalence of in-kind subsidies and income increases can easily be seen in the simpler one-dimensional case, formalized as follows.
A one-dimensional cost-share (or tax) rule is an n-tuple of functions $c i : R ϩ ϫ R r R: i ϭ 1, . . . , n%, which given an initial income vector~w An income (growth) pattern specifies the relation between individual and aggregate income. It is an n-tuple of functions $ J w i : R ϩ r R: i ϭ 1, . . . , n% satisfying S i J w i~w ! ϭ w. Given the cost-share rule and the income pattern, consumer-citizen i indirect utility function is
If v i is single peaked in b, then, under several specifications of the nature of political competition between two parties, political equilibrium leads to the level of b preferred by the median voter~i.e., the one with the median peak! at~w, s !.
2 The equivalence between increases in s and w 2 It is well known that this "median voter theorem" holds when~1! the two "parties" are merely two opportunistic candidates for office, each of whom desires solely to win the election and~2! both candidates know with certainty the distribution of voter preferences types!. If we retain assumption~2!, then a median-voter theorem continues to hold should the candidates have policy preferences, and each desires to maximize his expected utility, where no particular utility is attached to office holding other than its provision of the opportunity to implement policy. 
The community's marginal propensity to consume the public good out of income is the partial derivative
and the marginal propensity to consume the public good out of a federal grant is
Equivalence obtains when the two marginal propensities are equal, that is, when the difference The differentiation of~2! yields
By plugging~4!-~6! into~3! we obtain a rather complex expression for E G w Ϫ E G s , which differs from zero for arbitrary income patterns and one-dimensional contribution rules, implying that income increases are typically nonequivalent to in-kind subsidies.
Consider, as an illustration, interpretation~iii! above of policy variable b~Bradford and Oates 1971!, that is, b ϭ G Ϫ s, and i 's contribution is c i~w i
, and the second-order partial derivatives of c i are zero. Expressions~3!-~6! become, respectively,
Thus, equivalence obtains if and only if
That is, the tax rule and the income pattern must match in the sense that, as total income increases, the income of the median voter must increase at precisely the rate of her exogenous contribution to the public good; in other words, J w j~w ! ϭ k j ϩ z j w~for some parameter k j !. Bradford and Oates~1971, Sec. III! obtain the equivalence because they implicitly postulate such a match. 
. . , n, which guarantees a stronger form of equivalence, where not only the amount of the public good but also the final allocation of the private good is identical under either an increase in income or a federal grant.
Equilibrium with Multidimensional Policies

Theory
We now adopt the following two-dimensional tax rule: the amount paid by a consumer-citizen with income w i is max$0, t~w i Ϫ b !% negative taxes are ruled out in order to separate the financing of the local public good from redistributive taxation! where t is the marginal tax rate and b is the income exempt from taxation. Thus, we have two tax parameters. Formally, we view a policy as a triple t ϭ~b, t, G !, where G is, as before, the amount of the public good: there is a set of feasible policies in R
3
, but a balanced budget constraint implies that the policies are restricted to a two-dimensional manifold of R
. With a polity consisting of voters with heterogeneous incomes, there will in general be no Condorcet winner among these policies. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium in the game between two candidates who each seek only to win the electionthat is, no "median voter theorem." We require another theory of political competition to construct a coherent concept of political equilibrium. We shall here use the theory recently introduced in Roemer~1998, 1999! and further elaborated in Roemer~2001!.
That theory, which we first review briefly and informally, conceives of political competition as taking place between two parties, in which 1. each party "represents" a coalition of citizens, 2. parties consist of factions with different interests, and 3. parties are uncertain about the exact distribution of voter types.
Here we assume that all voters have the same utility function and differ only in their income capacity. 4 Imagine, for the moment, that all citizens whose income capacity is less than some number w * belong to the Left party and all others belong to the Right party. Let T denote the set of feasible policies, that is, such that b ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and the government balances its budget. As there is uncertainty, we denote by p~t L , t R ! the probability that policy t L defeats another policy t R . We denote the indirect utility of the type with income capacity w over policies by v~t, w!. Consider, now, type w L , defined as the average income capacity of those in party L. We define three factions within each party, which are called opportunists, reformists, and militants. The opportunists are concerned with maximizing the probability of victory-they are the dramatis personae of the Downs~1957! model. The reformists wish to maximize the expected utility of the party's members: we take this to mean they aim to maximize the expected utility of the average member. The militants are not concerned with victory, at least this time around: they want the party to propose a policy as close as possible to the party's ideal policy, which we take to be the ideal of the average member.
To be precise, facing a policy t R proposed by the opposition~Right!, the three factions in Left behave as follows.
• The opportunists would like to respond with a policy t that maximizes p~t, t R !.
• The reformists would like to respond with a policy t that maximizes
• The militants would like to respond with a t that maximizes v~t,w L !.
Similarly, there are three factions in Right, who have analogous interests. We now define a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium~PUNE! as a pair of policies~t
• given that Right is playing t R , there is no policy that all three factions in Left would weakly prefer to play and that one would~strictly! prefer to play instead of t L ; and
• given that Left is playing t L , there is no policy that all three of Right's factions would weakly prefer to play and that one would strictly! prefer to play instead of t R . Thus, the policy pair is Nash, where any deviation by a party must be unanimously agreed upon by its three factions.
It is generally the case that PUNEs exist with multidimensional policy spaces. Indeed, there is generally a two-dimensional manifold of PUNEs in the cross product of policy spaces T ϫ T, regardless of the dimension of T ! Our equilibrium concept is not yet complete, as we have yet to determine the "pivotal" type w * that determines party membership. To do this, we invoke a notion of stationarity in party membership: namely, in equilibrium, all members of each party should prefer the policy proposed by their own party to the policy of the other party. Were this not the case, then we would expect that dissidents would "vote with their feet" and move to the other party.
In sum, we define a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties, 5 which henceforth we call an equilibrium, as a triple of incomes $w * ,w L ,w R % and a pair of policies $t
The original definition of this equilibrium concept is in Roemer~2001, Chap. 13!. 
It is likewise true, in general, that there is a two-dimensional manifold of such equilibria in the space T ϫ T.
We next define the function p. Our primitive is the distribution of income, which is given by a probability measure F on the nonnegative real numbers, with associated distribution function F. For any pair of policies, denote by V~t L , t R ! the set of types~incomes! who prefer t L to t R . Then, were certainty to hold, the fraction F~V~t L , t R !! of the polity would vote Left. We now posit that this fraction is subject to a uniformly distributed error: thus the parties both believe that the actual fraction of the polity that will vote Left is uniformly distributed on the interval D ϭ @F~V~t
where h is some positive number less than one~assuming that D ʕ @0, 1#!. Thus, the probability that Left wins at this policy pair is the probability that a random variable, uniformly distributed on the above interval, is greater than one-half. It is easily computed that this probability is
The PUNE concept of political equilibrium is motivated at length in Roemer~2001!. Suffice to say that it is based upon observing the ubiquity of factional interests in the history of party politics. Parties attract candidates and others who are interested in winning above all~opportunists!, and activists who are interested in the policy their constituents will enjoy or suffer under~reformists!, and those who see the party mainly as an organ to publicize the "right line"~militants!. It can be shown that the PUNE concept models intrafaction bargaining over policy, as well as interparty competition. In particular, if there is sufficient convexity in the problem, then every endogenous party PUNE is the solution of a Nash bargaining problem among the factions of each party, taking as given the policy of the other party~Roemer 2001, Theorem 8.2!.~A converse statement holds as well.! The two-dimensional multiplicity of PUNEs is due to not specifying precisely what the relative strengths of the factions are within each party.
Application
We are now ready to apply the multidimensional concept of political equilibrium to study the flypaper effect. We take as the direct utility function of all citizens, over the private good~m! and the public good G !:
To recapitulate, a policy t ϭ~b, t, G ! provides the public good in value G and taxes all income of a citizen above an exemption of b, at constant marginal rate t. As proposed by Hamilton~1986!, we introduce a cost of taxation. We assume, in particular, that citizens do not supply labor inelastically, although their preferences for leisure are not formally modeled. Without microfoundations, we posit that if the tax rate is t , then an individual with an income capacity of w works long enough to produce an actual income of
where d ʦ @0, 1# is a constant independent of w, so that her tax bill is max $0, t~1 Ϫ dt !~w Ϫ b !% and her after-tax income is min $w, b ϩ~1 Ϫ t !~1 Ϫ dt !~w Ϫ b !%. We therefore can write the balanced-budget constraint as g~b, t,G; s ! ϭ 0, where
and s is the public-good grant provided by the federal government. To be explicit, define the set T of feasible policies to be all policies such that
We define the indirect utility function:
We next require a characterization of the set V~t L , t R !. Indeed, this set, for an arbitrary pair of policies~t L , t R !, is rather complicated. We shall compute it only for policies that we expect to be characteristic of equilibrium. We have the following proposition. PROPOSITION 
Let t L and t R be two policies such that
Note that here we postulate that all citizens have the same, Stone-Geary, utility function. As is well known, this realistically yields affine Engel curves.
where K ϭ~~G
Proof: See the Appendix.
Conditions~a! and~b! of the proposition are easy to interpret: the Left wants to tax only the fairly rich, and the Right wants to tax a larger segment of the citizenry~~a!!. Also, the Left wants to spend more on public goods than the Right~~b!!. The reader need not try to interpret condition~c!; we shall show that at equilibrium conditions~a!-~c! hold and hence the Left consists of all types whose income capacities are smaller than the number c~t L , t R !, while the Right consists of all those with larger income capacities.
It follows from the proposition and~7! that if, t L and t R satisfy premises~a!-~c! of the proposition, then we may write the function p as
A political economy is thus specified by the data vector~a, g, h, d, F, s !. Our study will consist in calculating the equilibria for three political economies:
where the mean of F * is one greater than the mean of F. Thus, the move from E1 to E2 is one where the federal subsidy to the state increases by one unit of income, and the move from E1 to E3 is one where that subsidy remains unchanged but mean income capacity increases by one unit. The simulation results will be given in Table 1 below.! The flypaper conjecture is the assertion that the increase in the equilibrium value of G in moving from E1 to E3 is substantially less than the increase in G in moving from E1 to economy E2.
Two modifications must be made to the above statement. First, an equilibrium in this section consists of a pair of policies, one for each party, and a probability that each party wins. We shall identify the predicted equilibrium value of G as the expected value of G at the equilibrium, that is,
There is a fairly natural interpretation of this move. Suppose that there are elections in many states, each of which is described by this model, and suppose that the draw on the random variable that determines which party wins is independent across states. Then, with a large number of states, the average value of implemented G should be close to G ave . But other interpretations are possible. The second modification is that, as we shall see, there is a continuum of equilibria in our model. These equilibria are quite concentrated in the policy space, and so their average value gives a good approximation of any one of them. We shall compute this continuum and identify the "predicted" value of the public good as the average of G ave over this continuum.
We observe, finally, that for a pair of policies~t L , t R ! to constitute a PUNE, it is necessary and sufficient that there be no agreeable deviation to both the militants and the opportunists in either party. For it is easy to see that if those two factions agree to deviate, the reformists will agree to, as well. Thus, although reformists indeed exist in reality, their presence, at least in our model, does not influence the nature of political equilibrium.
We now proceed to give a constructive characterization of our political equilibrium. Let~w
R ! be an equilibrium for the political economy~a, g, h, d, F, s !. We suppose, for the purposes of illustration, that the equilibrium has the properties that the only constraints that bind~seẽ 8!! are the budget constraints, that is,
Denote by ¹v~t,w! the gradient vector of the function v with respect to b, t, and G, evaluated at~t, w!: thus, a three-vector. 7 Likewise, denote by ¹g the gradient of the function G with respect to the same three arguments. The function p has six argumentsthe components of~t
, and G L , and by ¹ R p the three-gradient of p with respect to the three components of the R policy. Then it must be the case that
9! This condition says that if there is any direction d in which Left can deviate at t L that increases the utility of its militants, and moves it into the feasible policy region, then that deviation must reduce the utility of Left's opportunists. Were this not the case, then there would be a feasible deviation agreeable to both Left's militant and opportunist factions, contradicting the requirement of PUNE. In like manner, by considering the requirement for deviation-proofness in Right, we have
10! 7 Because we stay away from the case b ϭ w, where v has a kink, the gradients in the following expressions are well defined.
Now we can rewrite~9! as
11!
We now apply the separating hyperplane theorem~more precisely, its linear version: Farkas' lemma!, which tells us, from~11!, that the vector Ϫ¹ L p~t L , t R ! must lie in the cone spanned by the vectors ¹v~t L ,w L ! and ¹g~t L !, which is to say:
and, similarly from~10!:
In addition we have the equations
and the inequalities
and inequalities~a!,~b!, and~c! of the proposition. Only equation~16! may require explanation: it, in conjunction with~17! and~18!, guarantees that precisely those in the Left party prefer t L to t R and precisely those in the Right party prefer t R to t L . Thus, the characterization of our concept of political equilibrium is complete.
We now count equations: the unknowns are b
, y 1 , y 2~1 3 of them!, and the equations are~12!~three equations, one for each component of the gradients!,~13!~again three equations!,~14!,~15!,~16!,~17!, and~18!~11 of them!. Thus, we can expect that there are either no such equilibria or a two-manifold of them.
We are unable to construct these equilibria analytically; we must compute. Consequently, we specify an actual politico-economic environment as follows: a ϭ 0.25, g ϭ 5, h ϭ 0.4, d ϭ 0.75, s ϭ 3, and F the lognormal distribution with mean 40 and median 30. Thinking of the unit of income as $1,000, the distribution F captures approximately the U.S. income distribution in the early 1990s. The other parameters are self-explanatory. The value of h may seem high: we are asserting that, at the time parties announce their policies, the uncertainty surrounding the vote fraction is 640%.
Equations~12!-~18! now become completely specified. Using methods that need not detain us here, we find no solutions of this type.
We do 
,w L ,w R , y 1 , y 2 , and so there are either no solutions satisfying the inequality constraints or there is a unidimensional manifold of such solutions. We indeed find the latter.
Our method of finding equilibria is to computationally pave out the equilibrium policy manifold.
10 Figure 1 presents a graph of this manifold, projected onto the~t, G ! plane. The vertical line on the right in the figure constitutes Left~t, G ! components at equilibrium policies~note that t L is constant at 102d ϭ 0.667!; public expenditures vary between approximately 10.5 and 12~thousand dollars! per capita. The curve on the left side of the figure represents the~t, G ! components of Right policies in equilibrium. We see that the tax rate varies between 0.2 and 0.3 and that public goods are provided at the rates of between 9 and 9.5 thousand dollars per capita. It is worth noting how concentrated the equilibrium policies are in the policy space-so we do not lose much predictability because of the nonuniqueness of equilibrium.
Indeed, when we simulate the economies described by E2 and E3 above, we also find equilibria precisely of this type. We defined the distribution F * of political economy E3 as the lognormal distribution in which the mean income capacity is 41 and median income capacity is 41040!30; thus, it is the distribution in which mean income capacity has increased by one unit and all income capacities have increased, from the distribution in political economy E1, in the same proportion.
We summarize the characteristics of equilibrium for these three politicoeconomies in Table 1 . Each column in the table presents the average of values over the continuum of equilibria that exist for that economy. By examining the column G ave , we see that, when mean income capacity of the economy increases by $1,000, the predicted increase in expenditure on public goods is $157, but when the federal subsidy increases by $1,000, the predicted expenditure on public goods increases by $635. Thus, the increase in public expenditures induced by the federal subsidy is four times the increase engendered by a similar increase in mean income capacity: the flypaper conjecture holds. We have, in this calculation, taken the average value of PUNEs over the one-manifold of them that exists under our assumptions~we have a one-manifold, and not a two-manifold, because we fixed the Left party's policy at the ideal point of its militants!. We could further nail down the equilibrium to one point by specifying the relative bargaining strength of the militants and the opportunists in the Right party. That is an empirical question, which we do not pursue here.
Conclusion
The flypaper effect, generically understood as the nonequivalence of the effect on public spending of a federal grant and an increase in income of the same amount, is the rule in models of politico-economic equilibrium with diverse consumer-voters, and only for special and, we may add, unrealistic cases does equivalence obtain in such models.
This illustrates the fundamental difference between individual and collective decision making. An individual "flypaper effect" would indeed be an anomaly, a violation of individual rationality~to the extent that the relevant part of the budget constraint is invariant!. But the nonequivalence of increases in grants and community income is predicted, almost everywhere, by models that understand collective decision as the outcome of electoral competition among political parties. In political-equilibrium models, it is the equivalence, rather than the "flypaper effect," that is, if not anomalous, at least exceptional.
The realistic specification and calibration of a model yielding the large "marginal propensity to spend in public goods out of a federal grant" magnitudes observed in empirical work~see Hines and Thaler 1995, Table 1 ! is a different issue. We understand realism to demand~i! empirically sensible assumptions on the distribution of income;~ii! progressive taxation, which in turn demands more than one parameter in the tax rule~in fact, it has repeatedly been observed that two parameters suffice!. To that end, we have applied to this problem Roemer's~1998, 1999 Roemer's~1998, , 2001 ! model of the strategic interaction between two parties in multidimensional policy spaces, with the added feature of a cost of taxation~as proposed by Hamilton 1986!. No doubt due to luck, our first simulation, reported in Section 3.2 above, yielded a marginal propensity identical, up to two decimal places, to the marginal propensity averaged over the 10 studies reported in Table 1 of Hines and Thaler~1995!.
Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
Partition the set of types into the three subsets 
which reduces to while its right-hand side is greater than one. Ⅲ
